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A Non-Cooperative Game Approach to Autonomous Racing
Alexander Liniger and John Lygeros
Abstract—We consider autonomous racing of two cars and
present an approach to formulate racing decisions as a non-
cooperative non-zero-sum game. We design three different games
where the players aim to fulfill static track constraints as well as
avoid collision with each other; the latter constraint depends on
the combined actions of the two players. The difference between
the games are the collision constraints and the payoff. In the first
game collision avoidance is only considered by the follower, and
each player maximizes their own progress towards the finish
line. We show that, thanks to the sequential structure of this
game, equilibria can be computed through an efficient sequential
maximization approach. Further, we show these actions, if
feasible, are also a Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies of our second game where both players consider the
collision constraints. The payoff of our third game is designed to
promote blocking, by additionally rewarding the cars for staying
ahead at the end of the horizon. We show that this changes the
Stackelberg equilibrium, but has a minor influence on the Nash
equilibria. For online implementation, we propose to play the
games in a moving horizon fashion, and discuss two methods for
guaranteeing feasibility of the resulting coupled repeated games.
Finally, we study the performance of the proposed approaches
in simulation for a set-up that replicates the miniature race car
tested at the Automatic Control Laboratory of ETH Zu¨rich. The
simulation study shows that the presented games can successfully
model different racing behaviors and generate interesting racing
situations.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the major challenges in self-driving cars is the
interaction with other cars. This holds true for public roads
as well as race tracks, as the fundamental problem comes
from the fact that the intentions of the other cars are not
known. Autonomous driving and autonomous racing have been
successfully demonstrated repeatedly [1]–[4], while driving in
close proximity with unpredictable vehicles on public roads
was addressed in the DARPA Urban Challenge [5]. Urban
driving remained an active field of research ever since [6], [7].
Here we stay in this realm of driving in the presence of non-
cooperative neighbors but concentrate on the more controlled
environment of autonomous racing on a race track, where
the rival cars/opponents generate a dynamically changing
environment. In autonomous racing the goal is to drive as fast
as possible around a predefined track, making it necessary to
control the car at the limit of handling [3]. Moreover, in racing
the interactions between the cars are governed by less strict
rules than on public roads; for example, there are no lanes
and lane changes are not indicated. This implies that while
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in autonomous driving one can develop methods that assume
a minimum degree of cooperation from neighboring vehicles
[8]–[10], such an approach is more difficult for autonomous
racing. Therefore, methods for autonomous racing often ignore
obstacle avoidance altogether [3], [11], [12], or only consider
the avoidance of static obstacles [4], [13].
To deal with the uncertainty in the driving behavior of the
opponent cars, we propose here a game theoretical approach to
autonomous racing. Zero-sum game methods have been inves-
tigated for related problems in air traffic [14] and autonomous
driving [15]. Autonomous racing could be formulated as a
reach-avoid game [16], where efficient computational methods
for open-loop games exit [17], [18]. However, since such
games assume the worst-case behavior of the opponent, special
care is needed to ensure that the resulting driving style is not
too defensive for autonomous racing. Game theory has also
been used to derive driver models to simulate and verify au-
tonomous driving algorithms [19], [20]. Those approaches do
not assume a worst-case behavior and are typically investigated
by means of Stackelberg equilibria.
Adopting some of the assumptions of these game theory
based driver models, we assume that in a race the competing
car has no benefit from causing a collision. We propose to
model the interactions between race cars as a non-cooperative
non-zero-sum game, where the players only get rewarded if
they do not cause a collision. By restricting our attention
to finite horizon two-player games, we derive three different
games that, under the additional hypothesis that the action set
of the two players is finite are formulated as bimatrix games. In
the first game, both players maximize their progress, but only
the follower is concerned with avoiding collisions. For this
game, we show that the Stackelberg and Nash equilibria can be
computed by a sequential maximization approach, where the
leader determines his trajectory independently of the follower,
and the follower plays his best response. In the second game,
both players consider collisions. This allows to prove that
the players always choose a collision-free trajectory pair if
possible. Further, we show that if the sequential maximization
approach leads to a collision-free trajectory pair, this trajectory
pair is also a Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium of the second
game. In the third game, we propose a modified payoff that
promotes blocking behavior, by rewarding actions that do not
necessarily maximize progress towards the finishing line but
instead aim at preventing the opponent from overtaking. For
the third game, we show that the Stackelberg equilibrium
is a blocking trajectory pair if one exists, which stands in
contrast to the Nash equilibrium which only results in blocking
trajectories in particular cases.
The approach proposed here is related to [21], where a
similar game theoretic approach to autonomous racing is
proposed. Also related is the approach proposed in [22],
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which formulates a zero-sum game for drone racing, which
is played in a receding horizon fashion. However, in both [21]
and [22] the equilibria of the games are not analyzed and
only best-response dynamics are consider to solve the game.
One could in principle also consider extending autonomous
racing approaches with static obstacle avoidance, such as those
developed in [4], [13], to incorporate dynamical obstacles by
predicting the opponent movement and using time-varying
constraints. This, however, would not allow the flexibility of
our game theoretic approach, where both players influence
each other’s decisions.
For online implementation, we propose repeating the game
in a receding horizon fashion, similar to Model Predictive
Control (MPC), giving rise to a sequence of coupled games.
The use of moving horizon games has been proposed in
other applications [23]–[26], as a method to tackle higher
dimensional problems not tractable by dynamic programming.
We investigate the sequence of coupled games and propose
modified constraints based on viability theory which guarantee
recursive feasibility and introduce an exact soft constraint
reformulation that guarantees feasibility at all times. Compared
to [27] where viability theory was used to guarantee recursive
feasibility only with respect to track constraints, here recursive
feasibility is additionally guaranteed with respect to the actions
of the opponent player.
Finally, we investigate the game formulations in a simula-
tion study, replicating the miniature race car set-up presented
in [4], and investigate the influence of the game formulation
on different performance indicators such as the number of
overtaking maneuvers and the collision probability.
This paper is structured as follows, in Section II we in-
troduce the ingredients to formulate the racing games. Three
different racing games are formulated in Section III. The opti-
mal solution in terms of the Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium
is studied in Section IV. In Section V, we discuss feasibility of
moving horizon games. The performance of the approaches is
investigated in a simulation study in Section VI, while Section
VII provides some concluding remarks. Finally, in Appendix
A we give a summary of the vehicle model used in this paper,
as presented in [27].
II. GAME INGREDIENTS
In a car race, the goal is to finish first; mathematically
this can be interpreted as a non-cooperative dynamic game
where each player tries to reach the finishing line before
any other player. In Formula One or similar racing series
this game is tackled by separating it into two problems: the
first problem concerns slowly changing strategic decisions (pit
stops, power consumption, tire wear, etc.) and is solved by the
pit crew [28]. These high-level decisions are then executed
by a skilled race car driver, who solves the second problem
by driving the car at the handling limit while interacting
with other cars. In this paper, we concentrate on the task of
the race car driver and formulate it as a dynamic game. To
formulate the racing games three ingredients are required, first
an appropriate vehicle model, second an objective function
representing/approximating the “finish first” goal and third
state constraints characterizing collisions.
A. Dynamics
We start with the path planning model of [27] as the vehicle
model, where the dynamics are described by a nonlinear
discrete-time system of the form
x¯k+1 = f¯(x¯k, uk).
The state x¯ = [X,Y, ϕ, q] ∈ R4 represents the X and Y
position in global coordinates, the heading angle ϕ and q
denotes the constant velocity mode or in other words the
current motion primitive. The input u ∈ U(q) decides which
constant velocity mode is chosen next, where U(q) represents
concatenation constraints on the constant velocity modes,
reflecting for example acceleration limits. The update equation
for the state f¯ : R4 × R → R4 encodes the kinematic
constraints of the bicycle model and the dynamic constraints of
the constant velocity segment updates and is defined in detail
in [27]. We note that strictly speaking the model is hybrid
since one of the states, the index q of the constant velocity
segment, takes values in a finite set. Since the input constraints
U(q) ensure that if q is initialized in this finite set it will never
leave it, to simplify notation we can ignore this complication,
however, embed q in the real line, and think of it as real-valued.
For a more detailed description of the model see Appendix A.
B. Payoff
To define the objective function of the game, we extend
the state by an additional variable, a lap counter c, leading to
x = [x¯, c] ∈ R5. To define the dynamics of the lap counter we
consider the center line of the track as a parametrized curve
cl : [0, L) → R2, where 0 represents the “starting line”; note
that the argument of the function cl loops from L back to 0
every time the car completes a lap. Given a state x ∈ R5, we
define its projection p¯ : R5 → [0, L) onto the center line using
the first two components of the state
p¯(x) = arg min
l∈[0,L)
‖cl(l)− (X,Y )‖2 . (1)
Under the reasonable assumption that the track length is such
that the car can only cover a fraction of one lap in a single
sampling time, we then define the update equation of the lap
counter by
ck+1 =
{
ck + 1 if p¯(xk) > p¯([f¯(x¯k, uk), ck])
ck otherwise ,
initialized with c0 = 0. Appending this update equation to the
dynamics f¯ of x¯ gives rise to the dynamics of the combined
state
xk+1 = f(xk, uk) .
Note that the lap counter also takes values in the discrete set of
integers, but since its update equation is such that if initialized
in this set it remains in this set, we again embed in the real
line to simplify the notation. Finally, given a state x we define
the progress function
p(x) = p¯(x) + cL , (2)
that will form the basis for the objective function defined
below.
To encode the objective function of each car as well as
the fact that the cars should avoid collisions with each other
one needs to consider both cars; we use the superscript % =
1, 2 to distinguish the state of the two cars. Furthermore, to
formulate the racing games both cars start at their initial state
denoted by x 1 and x2, and even thought both cars use the path
planning model they may be described by different constant
velocity modes, highlighted by the superscript in f%(·, ·) and
U%. Therefore the dynamics of the two cars are given by,
x%0 = x
% , % = 1, 2 , k = 0, ..., N − 1 ,
x%k+1 = f
%(x%k, u
%
k) , u
%
k ∈ U%(q%k) . (3)
Due to the discrete nature of the admissible inputs U%(q%)
there exist a finite number of state-input trajectories. These
different trajectories are denoted by a subscript i = 1, ..., n
for car 1 and j = 1, ...,m for car 2 and the time step along
the trajectory with k = 1, ..., N , resulting in the notation x1i (k)
and x2j (k) denoting the different trajectories of the two cars
at time step k.
Each trajectory of the two cars has an associated progress
payoff, which is the progress (2) of its final state. The progress
payoff of the i-th and j-th trajectory of car 1 respectively car
2 is therefore given by p(x1i (N)) and p(x
2
j (N)). In addition
to progress, the objective function of the game should also
reflect the fact that the car would like to remain on the track
and avoid collisions with other cars. The first requirement can
be encoded by a set XT ⊆ R5 that encodes the requirement that
the first two components of the state are within the physical
limits of the track. One can then impose a constraint that for
all k = 1, ..., N , x1i (k) ∈ XT, and x2j (k) ∈ XT (or more
precisely, penalize the car in the objective function whenever
this constraint is violated).
Finally the collision constraints couple the two cars, in
the sense that they depend on the actions of both players.
One can encode this constraint through the signed distance
function1 [29]. If we assume that each car can be described
by a rotated rectangle (indeed any fixed shape) centred at the
(X,Y, ϕ) component of the state, then the signed distance of
the corresponding sets induces a function d : R5 × R5 → R
such that d(x1, x2) ≥ 0 if and only if the two cars do not
physically overlap. Thus, a trajectory pair (i, j) does not have
a collision if
d(x1i (k), x
2
j (k)) ≥ 0 , k = 1, ..., N . (4)
III. GAME FORMULATION
In this section we combine the game ingredients discussed
in Section II to formulate bimatrix games representing the
racing objective. Let us assume that the two cars are the
players; player 1 (P1) has n possible trajectories, and player 2
(P2) has m possible trajectories to choose from, constructed by
combinatorially selecting inputs from the corresponding sets
U1(q1) and U2(q2). The bimatrix game has two m×n payoff
matrices A and B with elements ai,j and bi,j representing,
1The singed distance between two sets R1 ∈ R2 and R2 ∈ R2 is
defined as sd(R1, R2) = dist(R1, R2)−pert(R1, R2), with dist(R1, R2) =
inf{‖T‖|(T + R1) ∪ R2 6= ∅} and pert(R1, R2) = inf{‖T‖|(T + R1) ∪
R2 = ∅}.
respectively, the payoffs of P1 and P2, if P1 adopts trajectory
i and P2 trajectory j. The payoff associated with a trajectory
pair (i, j) encodes information about both the progress and
the constraints.
Before formally introducing our different racing games, let
us give two definitions and an assumption used in the rest of
the paper.
Definition 1: A trajectory pair (i, j) is feasible if x1i (k) ∈
XT, x2j (k) ∈ XT, and d(x1i (k), x2j (k)) ≥ 0 for all k = 1, ..., N .
Definition 2: The leader of the game is the car which is
ahead at the beginning of the game, in other words P1 if
p(x1(0)) ≥ p(x2(0)) and P2 otherwise.
Without loss of generality we assume that P1 is the leader of
the game.
Assumption 1: At the beginning of the game P1 is ahead of
P2 or in other words p(x1(0)) ≥ p(x2(0)).
In following we discuss three different approaches to com-
bine the progress payoff, collision, and track constraints to
formulate three different bimatrix games, with increasingly
complex interactions between the players. In the first two
games, the winning objective is encoded as “drive as fast
as possible while avoiding collision with other cars”. In
the third game, a more complex payoff structure is used
to promote blocking behavior, or in other words prevent an
overtaking maneuver by driving sub-optimally with respect to
progress along the track. For simplicity, we consider racing
between only two cars. Racing with multiple opponents can
be treated similarly but is considerably more challenging from
a computational point of view.
A. Sequential Game
In the first game, the payoff matrices are designed such
that the players stay on track, drive as fast as possible and
avoid collisions. Roughly speaking, feasible trajectory pairs
receive a payoff equal to their progress if a trajectory leaves
the track, this trajectory receives a constant payoff of κ strictly
smaller than the payoff of any trajectory which remains within
the track. Likewise, trajectory pairs that collide also receive
a low payoff. However, due to the leader-follower structure
present in racing, we assume that only the follower (P2) is
concerned with collision avoidance. Therefore, if a trajectory
pair has a collision, P2 receives a low payoff of λ, whereas
P1 receives the payoff as though the collision was not present.
The resulting payoff matrices can be computed as follows,
ai,j =
{
κ if ∃k ∈ {1, ..., N} : x1i (k) 6∈ XT
p(x1i (N)) else
,
(5)
bi,j =

κ if ∃k ∈ {1, ..., N} : x2j (k) 6∈ XT
λ
else if ∃k ∈ {1, ..., N} :
d(x1i (k), x
2
j (k)) < 0
p(x2j (N)) else
.
Intuitively, if κ and λ are smaller than
min(mini(p(x
1
i (N)),minj p(x
2
j (N))) both player, if possible,
choose a trajectory which remains within the track and P2
will avoid a collision, see Section IV for a formal discussion.
This condition can be fulfilled by choosing κ, λ < 0, as the
progress is always positive. For the rest of the paper, we
assume that 0 > λ ≥ κ, which implicitly penalizes collisions
less than leaving the track.
Note that in this game the payoff of the leader does not
depend on the actions of the follower; in other words, all
elements of a row of the payoff matrix A will have the same
value. We denote by ai the leader payoff for action i ∈ Γ1 (in
other words, the value of all elements of row i in matrix A)
to highlight the fact that it does not depend on the actions of
the follower. Due to this purely sequential structure the game
is called the sequential game.
To visualize the sequential game (5) let us look at one racing
situation with only three possible trajectories for each player,
see Fig. 1. We determine the progress by assuming that the
zero point is at the beginning of the track interval shown and
that the interval is 0.95 m long, with 12 cm long cars, which
corresponds to the test track in our lab [4] and the scale used
in the subsequent simulation study. We use κ = −10 and
λ = −1 leading to the payoff matrices A (for the leader P1)
and B (for P2) of the racing game (5)
Fig. 1. The leader P1 (red car) is in front of P2 (yellow car). Each player
has three trajectories green, blue, red from top to bottom, and the trajectories
are numbered from top (1) to bottom (3).
A =
0.83 0.83 0.830.88 0.88 0.88
−10 −10 −10
 B =
0.81 0.86 −100.81 −1 −10
0.81 0.86 −10
 . (6)
For each player, the bottom trajectory leaves the track,
so the payoff is κ = −10 for the corresponding trajectory,
irrespective of the actions of the other player. This leads to
the third row of A and third column of B identically equal to
−10. If both players select their middle trajectory, there is a
collision, giving rise to the payoff λ = −1 in the (2, 2) entry
of B, note that a2,2 is equal to the progress. The remaining
combinations of actions neither leave the track nor cause a
collision. Hence the payoff is the progress, giving rise to the
entries in the order of 0.8 in the two matrices.
B. Cooperative Game
Compared to the sequential game in the cooperative game,
the leader does also consider collisions. This is incorporated
into the game by modifying the payoff such that also the leader
receives a payoff of λ if there is a collision. In other words,
both players only receive the progress payoff if a trajectory
pair is feasible. The resulting payoff matrices can be computed
as follows,
ai,j =

κ if ∃k ∈ {1, ..., N} : x1i (k) 6∈ XT
λ
else if ∃k ∈ {1, ..., N} :
d(x1i (k), x
2
j (k)) < 0
p(x1i (N)) else
,
(7)
bi,j =

κ if ∃k ∈ {1, ..., N} : x2j (k) 6∈ XT
λ
else if ∃k ∈ {1, ..., N} :
d(x1i (k), x
2
j (k)) < 0
p(x2j (N)) else
,
Note that if we choose κ, λ < 0 as suggested in the
sequential game, in case of the cooperative game the optimal
trajectory pair will be feasible whenever possible since none of
the players would benefit from violating the constraints, see
Theorem 1 for a formal discussion. Due to this cooperative
obstacle avoidance approach, we call it the cooperative game.
When investigating the racing situation in Fig. 1, the payoff
matrices A and B for the cooperative game are
A =
0.83 0.83 0.830.88 −1 0.88
−10 −10 −10
 B =
0.81 0.86 −100.81 −1 −10
0.81 0.86 −10
 . (8)
Compared to the payoff matrices of the sequential game (6)
the only difference is a2,2 which is now −1, since P1 also
considers collisions.
C. Blocking game
When racing, maximizing progress is only a means to an
end, the real objective is to finish first. In some cases, it
may, therefore, be beneficial to prevent the opponent from
overtaking, even if that means less progress. We refer to this
behavior as “blocking”. In our third game, we modify the
payoff matrices of the cooperative game (7) to reward staying
ahead at the end of the horizon, giving rise to the so-called
blocking game. More precisely we add a parameter w ≥ 0,
which allows to trade-off staying ahead and maximizing
progress. The resulting payoff matrices can be computed as
follows,
ai,j =

κ if ∃k ∈ {1, ..., N} : x1i (k) 6∈ XT
λ
else if ∃k ∈ {1, ..., N} :
d(x1i (k), x
2
j (k)) < 0
p(x1i (N)) else if p(x
1
i (N)) < p(x
2
j (N))
p(x1i (N)) + w else
,
(9)
bi,j =

κ if ∃k ∈ {1, ..., N} : x2j (k) 6∈ XT
λ
else if ∃k ∈ {1, ..., N} :
d(x1i (k), x
2
j (k)) < 0
p(x2j (N)) else if p(x
1
i (N)) ≥ p(x2j (N))
p(x2j (N)) + w else
.
Note that in this case there are two terms linking the payoff
of the two players, the collision constraint in the second line
in (9) and the blocking reward in the fourth line.
To visualize the effect of the additional payoff term, we look
at a slightly more complex racing situation illustrated in Fig.
2, where compared to the first racing situation in Fig. 1 both
players have one additional trajectory and P2 has the chance
to overtake P1.
Fig. 2. Illustration of a blocking situation, where P2 (yellow car) has a chance
to overtake P1 (red car) at the end of the horizon by choosing the green
trajectory (2). However, by choosing the dashed green blocking trajectory
P1 can avoid an overtaking maneuver, forcing P2 to choose his gray dashed
trajectory (1) to avoid a collision. The trajectories are again numbered from
top to bottom.
The payoff matrices of the bimatrix game corresponding to
the racing situation in Fig. 2, with w = 0.5 are,
A =

0.83 + 0.5 −1 0.83 0.83 + 0.5
0.85 + 0.5 −1 −1 0.85 + 0.5
0.88 + 0.5 0.88 −1 0.88 + 0.5
−10 −10 −10 −10
 ,
B =

0.81 −1 0.86 + 0.5 −10
0.81 −1 −1 −10
0.81 0.9 + 0.5 −1 −10
0.81 + 0.5 0.9 + 0.5 0.86 + 0.5 −10
 . (10)
IV. CHARACTERIZATION OF EQUILIBRIA
A. Equilibrium concepts and feasibility
Given the bimatrix games (5), (7), and (9), the question
is how to find the optimal trajectory pair. Note that we only
consider pure strategies, where the action space of the two
players is given by Γ1 := {1, 2, .., n} and Γ2 := {1, 2, ..,m}.
Further, we consider two types of equilibria, the classical
Stackelberg and Nash.
1) Stackelberg Equilibrium: In the Stackelberg equilibrium,
there exists a leader, and a follower and the leader can enforce
his strategy on the follower. It is assumed that the follower
plays rationally, in the sense that he plays the best response
with respect to the strategy of the leader. Thus, the leader
chooses the strategy which maximizes his payoff given the
best response of the follower.
Definition 3 ([30]): A strategy pair (i∗, j∗) ∈ Γ1 × Γ2 is a
Stackelberg equilibrium of a bimatrix game A, B, with P1 as
leader, if:
i∗ = arg max
i∈Γ1
min
j∈R(i)
ai,j , j
∗ = arg max
j∈Γ2
bi∗,j ,
where R(i) := arg maxj∈Γ2 bi,j is the best response of P2 to
the strategy i ∈ Γ1 of P1.
Note that the best trajectories of both the leader and
the follower may be non-unique. For the leader all optimal
trajectories lead to the same pay-off; the leader can, therefore,
pick anyone among them and announce it to the follower [30].
The follower can then select any one of the (possibly many)
best responses to this announced trajectory of the leader.
2) Nash Equilibrium: The Nash equilibrium is a trajectory
pair, such that there is no incentive for either of the players
to deviate unless the other player does.
Definition 4 ([30] ): A strategy pair (i∗, j∗) ∈ Γ1 × Γ2 is
a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game A, B if the following
inequalities are fulfilled:
ai∗,j∗ ≥ ai,j∗ ∀i ∈ Γ1 ,
bi∗,j∗ ≥ bi∗,j ∀j ∈ Γ2 .
We note that, unlike zero sum games, existence of Nash pure
strategy equilibria (as Definition 4) is not guaranteed for our
bimatrix games, even though the payoff matrices are bounded;
we address the issue of existence of pure strategy Nash
equilibria below. Moreover, if Nash equilibria do exists, there
may be multiple of them with potentially different payoffs for
the two players [30]. To distinguish between them we use the
notion of “betterness” following terminology of [30].
Definition 5 ([30] ): A strategy pair (i1, j1) is said to be
better than another strategy pair (i2, j2), if ai1,j1 ≥ ai2,j2 ,
bi1,j1 ≥ bi2,j2 , and at least one of the inequalities is strict.
If neither equilibrium is better than the other we then
say that the two equilibria are incomparable. The existence
of better equilibria forms the basis for a non-cooperative
equilibrium consensus [30].
3) Feasibility Assumptions: Since feasibility of a trajectory
pair is fundamental for the game, but the constraints are only
considered in the payoff, we investigate assumptions under
which a feasible trajectory pair is obtained.
Assumption 2.a: There exists a feasible trajectory pair (i, j)
according to Definition 1.
To establish a connection between the sequential and the
cooperative game we need a more restrictive assumption
involving the payoff of the leader (P1) in the sequential game
(5).
Assumption 2.b: There exists a trajectory pair (i, j), such
that maxi∈Γ1 ai > κ and maxj∈Γ2 mini′∈arg maxi∈Γ1 bi′,j > λ.
Note that, the payoff of the follower is identical in both
the cooperative game (7) and the sequential game (5), thus
the assumption is well defined for both games. One can
easily verify that Assumption 2.b is more restrictive, since any
cooperative game which fulfills Assumption 2.b also fulfills
Assumption 2.a, however, the opposite does not necessarily
hold. We note that Assumption 2.b is not always fulfilled
in practice, but the assumption is necessary for our technical
results.
B. Equilibrium of the sequential Game
When investigating the sequential game (5) in more detail
one can see that it is not really a game since the decisions
of the follower do not influence the decisions of the leader.
Thus the optimal trajectory pair can simply be computed by a
sequential maximization approach, where the leader selects an
optimal trajectory without considering the follower. Similar to
the Stackelberg equilibrium this trajectory is then announced to
the follower, who selects a best response. This can be summa-
rized in the following two-step sequential maximization, which
determines the sequential optimal trajectory pair (is, js),
is = arg max
i∈Γ1
ai , j
s = arg max
j∈Γ2
bis,j . (11)
One can show that trajectory pairs (is, js) that satisfy (11)
are both Stackelberg and Nash equilibria of the sequential
game (5); the proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 below and
is omitted in the interest of space. Moreover, if Assumption 2.b
holds, these trajectory pairs are also feasible; this follows di-
rectly from Assumption 2.b, which guarantees that the follower
has a feasible response to the announced optimal trajectory of
the leader. Once again multiple optimal trajectories for the
leader do not pose a problem since their payoffs are the same
and the chosen trajectory is announced to the follower.
In the racing situation in Fig. 1 Assumption 2.b is fulfilled
and the sequential optimal trajectory pair is (2, 1), where the
car in front goes straight and the car in the back avoids the car
in front by going left. It is easy to verify that this trajectory
pair is indeed a Nash and a Stackelberg equilibrium for (6).
C. Equilibrium of the cooperative game
Let us now focus on the more complex cooperative game
(7) which does not exhibit the sequential structure of (5).
When investigating the racing situation in Fig. 1 with the
corresponding payoff matrices (8), we see that the Stackelberg
equilibrium of the game is the trajectory pair (2, 1), which is
identical to the sequential optimal trajectory pair. Furthermore,
we can also verify that the sequential optimal trajectory pair
is also a Nash equilibrium. Note that this is not the only Nash
equilibrium, however: the trajectory pair (1, 2) is also a Nash
equilibrium.
A natural question that arises is how can the two cars
choose one of the two Nash equilibria. This is generally a
difficult question in game theory. In our example, if each
player assumes that the equilibrium that maximizes his own
progress will be chosen, this would result in the trajectory
pair (2,2) which is not a Nash equilibrium and results in
a collision2. This is because none of the Nash equilibria is
better than the other. To resolve this issue ahead of the game
the players can agree on rules about how to pick a Nash
equilibrium in the case of multiple equilibria; we call those
“rules of the road”. Here we use a rule that says that if there
are multiple Nash equilibria, the equilibrium with the largest
payoff for the leader (P1) is chosen. In the racing situation
in Fig. 1, the Nash equilibrium which fulfills the rules of the
road is the trajectory pair (2, 1).
Note that in this case all the different equilibrium concepts,
as well as the sequential game, lead to the same feasible
2Note that in this example the best-response dynamics as proposed in [21]
would cycle between trajectory pair (2, 2) and (1, 1).
trajectory pair. Indeed one can show that under Assumption
2.b this property holds generally.
Theorem 1:
(a) If Assumption 2.a holds, all Stackelberg equilibria are
feasible, there exists at least one feasible Nash equilib-
rium and all feasible Nash equilibria are better than all
infeasible Nash equilibria.
(b) Let Πs denote the set of all Nash/Stackelberg equilibria
of the sequential game, Πst the set of all Stackelberg
equilibria of the cooperative game, Πn,RoR the set of all
Nash equilibria of the cooperative game that fulfill the
rules of the road, and Πn the set of all Nash equilibria of
the cooperative game. If Assumption 2.b holds, then
∅ 6= Πs = Πst = Πn,RoR ⊆ Πn .
Proof: We start by noting that due to the payoff structure
in the cooperative game (7), specifically the symmetry of the
collision constraints, it holds that
ai,j = λ⇔ bi,j = λ . (12)
Part (a): Under Assumption 2.a there exists i ∈ Γ1
such that bi,j > λ for all j ∈ R(i), hence by (12)
maxi∈Γ1 minj∈R(i) ai,j > λ and therefore all Stackelberg
equilibria are feasible.
We now show that the Stackelberg equilibrium is a
Nash equilibrium, which by virtue of the previous point
shows that a feasible Nash equilibrium exists. Note that
maxi∈Γ1 minj∈R(i) ai,j = maxi∈Γ1 maxj∈Γ2 ai,j due to the
payoff structure. This observation together with P2 playing
best response shows that the Nash inequalities are fulfilled.
Finally, note that for any infeasible Nash equilibrium at least
one of the two players is not using their feasible trajectory, as
otherwise, the Nash would be feasible. Moreover, none of the
two players violates the track constraint; if they did, they could
improve their payoff from κ to (at least) λ by switching to
another trajectory, contradicting Nash. Hence neither is using
their trajectory from the feasible pair, as if one was the other
could unilaterally improve their payoff by also switching to
their feasible trajectory, contradicting Nash again. Therefore
an infeasible Nash equilibrium only exists if both players have
a payoff of λ but for both players, any unilateral change would
result in a payoff of λ or κ. However, any feasible Nash
equilibrium is better than such an infeasible Nash equilibrium,
as in the feasible case both players receive the progress payoff,
which is by definition greater than λ.
Part (b): If Assumption 2.b holds then bis,j > λ for all
j ∈ R(is), which again implies by (12) that minj∈R(is) ais,j =
p(x1is(N)). This also shows that the sequential optimal trajec-
tory pair is feasible and the set of trajectory pairs is non-empty.
Furthermore, the sequential optimal trajectory pair (is, js)
is identical to the Stackelberg equilibrium since by the above
observation maxi∈Γ1 minj∈R(i) ai,j = maxi∈Γ1 ai. Thus, we
can reformulate the Stackelberg equilibrium as,
i∗ = arg max
i∈Γ1
min
j∈R(i)
ai,j = arg max
i∈Γ1
ai ,
j∗ = arg max
j∈Γ2
bi∗,j
which is identical to the sequential maximization approach
(11) and proves the second equality.
Finally, we show that the sequential optimal trajectory pair
(is, js) is a Nash equilibrium that fulfills the rules of the road.
We know that ais,js = p(x1is(N)), leading to
ais,js = p(x
1
is(N)) ≥ ai,js ∀i ∈ Γ1 ,
bis,js = bis,R(is) ≥ bis,j ∀j ∈ Γ2 .
The first inequality holds since p(x1is(N)) is the best possible
payoff for P1, the second because P2 plays best response.
Therefore, the trajectory pair (is, js) is a Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, the trajectory pair (is, js) is the Nash equilibrium
which fulfills the rules of the road, as it yields to the best
possible payoff for P1, which shows the last two relationships.
To illustrate the proof of Theorem 1 (a), consider the
situation depicted in Fig. 3 with the payoff matrices in (13).
In this case, two Nash equilibria exist, (2, 2) which is feasible
with a payoff of (0.87, 0.89), and (1, 3) which is infeasible
with a payoff of (−1,−1). The feasible Nash is better than
the infeasible one and is thus preferable for both players.
Fig. 3. A racing game with an infeasible Nash equilibrium. Each player has
three trajectories green, blue, red from top to bottom, and the trajectories are
numbered from top (1) to bottom (3). The green trajectory (1) of P1 (red car)
collides both with the blue (2) and the red (3) trajectory of P2 (yellow car)
and the blue trajectory (2) of P1 also collides with the red trajectory (3) of
P2.
A =
0.84 −1 −10.87 0.87 −1
−10 −10 −10
 B =
−10 −1 −1−10 0.89 −1
−10 0.81 0.81
 . (13)
Thanks to Theorem 1, if Assumption 2.b holds we can
use the sequential maximization approach (11) to compute
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. This can offer significant
computational advantages since it is not necessary to generate
all entries of A and B. Moreover, collision checks are only
necessary between the optimal trajectory of the leader and the
possible trajectories of the follower; this dramatically reduces
the computational burden as we will discuss in Section VI.
We note that the only structure necessary for Theorem 1
is the fact that the decisions of the players are only linked
through the constraints as the progress payoff solely depends
on the players own action. Thus, Theorem 1 would still
hold if one uses objective functions other than progress, e.g.,
fuel efficiency, or even in other applications that enjoy a
similar structure. This suggests that the theorem may have
wider applicability, as many robotic multi-agent problems with
collision constraints can be formulated such that they have the
same structure.
Note that if Assumption 2.b is not fulfilled, in the coop-
erative game the leader will choose a trajectory which allows
the follower to make a choice such that the resulting trajectory
pair is feasible (as long as Assumption 2.a holds). On the other
hand, in the sequential game the leader does not consider the
follower and a trajectory pair that satisfies (11) may be not
feasible even if Assumption 2.a is satisfied.
D. Equilibrium of the blocking game
Finally let us investigate the blocking game. To formalize
the discussion, we start by defining a blocking trajectory pair.
Let (icg, jcg) denote a Stackelberg equilibrium of the coop-
erative game (7). Note that if there are multiple Stackelberg
equilibria, all these trajectory pairs have the same progress
payoff. Therefore, all the progress based arguments still hold
in the case of multiple equilibria.
Definition 6: A trajectory pair (i, j) is blocking if the
following properties hold: (i) the Stackelberg equilibrium of
the cooperative game (icg, jcg) is such that P1 gets overtaken
at the end of the horizon p(x1icg (N)) < p(x
2
jcg (N)), (ii) the
pair (i, j) is such that P1 does not get overtaken p(x1i (N)) >
p(x2j (N)), (iii) the pair (i, j) is feasible ai,j > λ and bi,j > λ,
(iv) for all jc ∈ Γ2 such that p(x2jc(N)) > p(x2j (N)), it holds
that bi,jc ≤ λ.
A blocking trajectory pair corresponds to a collision-free
trajectory pair where P1 is ahead at the end of the horizon. P1
achieves this by choosing a trajectory, such that any trajectory
of P2 that would achieve a larger progress collides with
this trajectory of P1. The last condition also implies that P2
plays a best response, as any other trajectory would lead to a
smaller payoff. Among all blocking trajectory pairs fulfilling
properties (i)-(iv), let (ib, jb) denote the one which achieves
the largest progress for the leader.
When investigating the racing situation in Fig. 2 with the
payoff matrices (10), we can see that the additional payoff term
promotes blocking behavior since the Stackelberg equilibrium
(2, 1) of the game is a blocking trajectory where P1 drives a
curve to prevent P2 from overtaking at the end of the horizon.
In contrast, the (unique) Nash equilibrium is (3, 2), where
P1 drives straight to maximize progress, but P2 can overtake
P1 at the end of the horizon. Interestingly, this is the same
trajectory pair which would be optimal if the cooperative game
payoff would be used. Similar to the cooperative game, the
observations from the simple racing situation can again be
generalized.
Theorem 2: Under Assumption 2.a:
(a) If p(x1icg (N)) > p(x
2
jcg (N)), or if p(x
1
icg (N)) ≤
p(x2jcg (N)) but there does not exists a blocking trajectory
pair, then the Stackelberg equilibrium (icg, jcg) of the co-
operative game (7) is identical to the Stackelberg equilib-
rium of the blocking game (9). If there exists a blocking
trajectory pair and if p(x1icg (N)) ≤ p(x1ib(N)) +w, then
(ib, jb) is the Stackelberg equilibrium of the blocking
game (9).
(b) The Stackelberg equilibrium (icg, jcg) of the cooperative
game (7) is a Nash equilibrium of the blocking game (9).
And if a blocking trajectory (ib, jb) is a Nash equilibrium
of the cooperative game (7) it is a Nash equilibrium of
the blocking game (9).
Proof: We start by noting that by Assumption 2.a and
Theorem 1 we know that (icg, jcg) is feasible, and since
the constraints are the same in the cooperative game and
the blocking game, we know that this trajectory pair is also
feasible for the blocking game.
Part (a): Given this observation we know that if
p(x1icg (N)) > p(x
2
jcg (N)), it follows that the payoffs for
the blocking game of this trajectory pair are, aicg,jcg =
p(x1icg (N)) + w and bicg,jcg = p(x
2
jcg (N)). We now show
that jcg is the best response of P2 to icg given the payoff
of the blocking game (9). We know that jcg maximizes the
progress given icg due to the formulation of the cooperative
game (7), and since the additional payoff only depends on
the progress, we know that no other trajectory would get the
additional reward, thus jcg is the best response. Second, icg
maximizes the payoff for P1, therefore, (icg, jcg) is also the
Stackelberg equilibrium of the blocking game.
Second, if p(x1icg (N)) ≤ p(x2jcg (N)) and there exists no
blocking trajectory pair (ib, jb), or in other words P1 cannot
avoid the overtaking maneuver, the payoff of P1 does not
depend on the blocking payoff, and is therefore maximized
by icg . As jcg leads to the largest possible progress for P2
and by definition gets the additional reward w, jcg is also the
best response for the blocking game (9).
Third, let us assume there exists a blocking trajectory
pair (ib, jb). The pair will be chosen if it leads to the
largest payoff for the two players. For P1 this is the case
if p(x1ib(N)) + w ≥ ai,j for all i and j, since ib is the best
possible blocking trajectory other blocking strategies have a
lower payoff. Thus, the inequality holds if the payoff aib,jb
is larger than the largest payoff of a feasible non-blocking
trajectory pair, which is p(x1icg (N)). Thus P1 chooses i
b
if p(x1icg (N)) ≤ p(x1ib(N)) + w and by definition jb is
the optimal response for P2. Thus (ib, jb) is a Stackelberg
equilibrium.
Part (b): To show that (icg, jcg) is a Nash equilibrium of the
blocking game (9), two cases are possible. First, p(x1icg (N)) >
p(x2jcg (N)), where aicg,jcg = p(x
1
icg (N)) + w and bicg,jcg =
p(x2jcg (N)), and second, p(x
1
icg (N)) ≤ p(x2jcg (N)), where
aicg,jcg = p(x
1
icg (N)) and bicg,jcg = p(x
2
jcg (N)) + w. In the
first case, because jcg is the best response in terms of progress
we know that if jcg does not get the additional reward, no other
trajectory gets the reward. Therefore, it holds that for all j ∈
Γ2, bicg,jcg ≥ bicg,j . As a consequence for P2 the trajectory
pair (icg, jcg) fulfills the Nash inequality. For P1 the Nash
inequality aicg,jcg ≥ ai,jcg is fulfilled since it is the largest
feasible payoff for P1. In the second case, a similar argument
holds, which is omitted in the interest of space. Thus, (icg, jcg)
is a Nash equilibrium of the blocking game (9) even though
the additional payoff is not considered in the computation of
the trajectory pair.
For the second part, we now assume that the Nash equilib-
rium is a blocking trajectory pair (ib, jb). The Nash inequality
for P2 bib,jb ≥ bib,j is always fulfilled by Definition 6, since
no action of P2 can get the additional payoff w and jb is the
best response of P2. However, the Nash inequality for P1,
p(x1ib(N)) + w ≥ ai,jb ∀i ∈ Γ1 ,
is only fulfilled, if for all i ∈ Γ1 such that p(x1i (N)) >
p(x1ib(N)), it holds that ai,jb ≤ λ. This condition, however,
is identical to the one required by the Nash equilibrium of
the cooperative game (7). Thus, for (ib, jb) to be a Nash
equilibrium of the blocking game (9), it also needs to be a
Nash equilibrium of the cooperative game (7).
This illustrates, that if the goal is to encourage blocking
the Stackelberg equilibrium is the appropriate equilibrium
concept. Furthermore, this also shows that blocking needs an
asymmetric information pattern, which is logical as the leader
needs to be sure that he can enforce the blocking trajectory
on the follower.
One can recognize that the blocking game subsumes the
cooperative game, more precisely for w = 0 the two games
are identical. This poses the question for which values of w the
equilibrium changes. This can be answered for the Stackelberg
equilibrium using part (a) of Theorem 2. For a game instance
where a blocking trajectory pair (ib, jb) exists, there is a
discrete change in the optimal trajectory pair when increasing
w. This switch occurs the moment p(x1ib(N)) + w becomes
larger that p(x1icg (N)); in (10) the switch occurs if w ≥ 0.03.
From a racing point of view, it is best to choose w large
enough such that whenever possible the blocking trajectory is
selected.
V. MOVING HORIZON GAMES
The racing games presented in Section III are finite horizon
games. To introduce feedback we propose to play the games
in a moving horizon fashion, solving the game with the full
horizon but only applying the first input, then reformulating
the game based on the current state measurement and solving
again. Similar to [24] and [25], this allows to approximately
solve an infinite horizon game, which would not be tractable
using dynamic programming, by solving a series of finite
horizon games.
An inherent problem of moving horizon approaches is that
they, in general, do not guarantee feasibility of closed-loop
operation. This problem can be tackled by using terminal set
constraints which ensure recursive feasibility by guaranteeing
that the terminal state is within an invariant set [31]. Alter-
natively one can use soft constraints, rendering the problem
feasible at all times [32].
A. Terminal viability constraints
If the goal is to guarantee feasibility of the racing games at
all times when played in a receding horizon fashion, one can
use tools from viability theory. Viability theory is concerned
with finding the set of initial conditions for which there exists a
viable solution, i.e., a solution to a difference inclusion which
forever remains within a given closed constraint set K [33].
For a difference inclusion xk+1 ∈ F (xk) this set of initial
conditions is called the viability kernel (denoted by ViabF (K))
and can be numerically approximated by the viability kernel
algorithm, see [34] for more details.
In [27] viability theory was already used to guarantee
recursive feasibility with respect to track constraints in an
autonomous racing set up. Here we extend this approach
to also consider viability with respect to collisions between
the cars, relying on the simple observation that, once in the
viability kernel there exists an input which keeps the system
state in the viability kernel [35]. We distinguish the sequential
game from the cooperative and blocking games since the
former requires the more restrictive Assumption 2.b to hold
whereas for the latter two Assumption 2.a suffices to guarantee
feasibility.
For the sequential game the aim is to fulfill Assumption
2.b recursively this causes technical difficulties due to dis-
continuities that arise in the dynamics which need to be
tackled appropriately. One discontinuity arises because the
leader and follower may switch roles from one solution of
the game to the next. This problem can be resolved using
a hybrid state in combination with a spatial regularization
to prevent unwanted switching behavior, see [36]. Note that
the system is now hybrid requiring a hybrid viability kernel
algorithm [37]. Second, the optimal viable policy of the leader
leads to discontinuities which can be tackled by appropriately
smoothing the policy of the leader. Given this continuous
dynamical model incorporating the sequential maximization
approach, the viability kernel with respect to the track and
collision constraints can be computed. If the game starts with
the car states in this viability kernel then the follower always
has a viable trajectory if the leader plays his optimal viable
trajectory.
The cooperative and blocking game, require a conceptually
simpler viability kernel since guaranteeing Assumption 2.a
recursively can be assured if there always exists a cooperative
collision avoiding trajectory pair. Therefore, both cars need a
viable trajectory with respect to track and collision constraints
something that can be ensured by computing a standard
viability computation in the product space.
For all three games, we can theoretically compute an
appropriate viability kernel, which can be imposed as a ter-
minal constraint to guarantee recursive feasibility. This can be
achieved by penalizing trajectory pairs for which the terminal
state is not in the viability kernel by a payoff λ. If the viability
kernel is empty safe racing is not possible, as the cars are
doomed to either collide or leave the track eventually; the
same is true if the viability kernel is not empty but does not
contain the initial condition of the game.
Unfortunately, practically it is not possible to compute the
described viability kernels as they require one to consider the
state of both players simultaneously. As this joint state is ten-
dimensional the computation is not tractable with the standard,
grid based viability kernel algorithm. From a practical point of
view, it is possible to use the viability kernel with respect to the
track constraints, as proposed in [27], as a first approximation.
This computation is tractable [27] and it is easy to see that
the product of the track viability kernels for the two cars
is a superset of all racing viability kernels discussed above;
ensuring that the system remains in this product set therefore
provides a necessary condition for the recursive feasibility of
the games. We adopt this approach in our simulation study
below.
B. Soft Constraints
Alternatively one can use soft constraints that allow for-
mulating a game which always finds an optimal trajectory.
The idea is to relax the constraints and consider them by
reducing the payoff depending on how much the constraints
are violated. The advantage compared to the above discussed
terminal constraints is that no viability kernels need to be
computed. However, the resulting trajectory is not always
feasible with respect to the constraints.
The idea is similar to the soft constraints in MPC [32],
however, the implementation in the game set-up is quite
different. In our racing games, we use soft constraints for the
collision constraints only. In a first step, given a trajectory
pair we can compute the smallest relaxation of the constraint
necessary, which we call slack multipliers of a trajectory pair
Si,j =
∑N
k=1 max(−d(x1i (k), x2j (k)), 0). Given our collision
constraints, this corresponds to how much the two cars pene-
trate each other and therefore Si,j is always positive. Second,
instead of penalizing a colliding trajectory pair with a payoff
of λ, the soft constrained game computes the payoff neglecting
the collision constraints and then reduces this payoff by σSi,j ,
where σ is a positive weight. Thus, if σ is chosen large enough,
the players in the game have still no benefit from violating the
collision constraints, and therefore the optimal trajectory pair
does not change. This is often called an exact soft constraint
reformulation, and it can be shown that there always exist such
a σ for all racing games. The main reason this holds is that
there is only a finite number of trajectories and all payoffs as
well as the slack multipliers Si,j are bounded. On the other
hand, if there is no feasible trajectory the soft constrained
game does still find a reasonable trajectory pair by trading off
violation of the collision constraint and payoff depending on
the value of σ.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Simulation set-up
Our simulation study replicates the miniature race car set-
up, hosted at the automatic control laboratory at ETH Zu¨rich
[4]. The set-up consists of miniature race cars measuring
12×5 cm, driving around an approximately 18 m long track
(https://youtu.be/RlZdMojOni0). To simulate the cars we use
a dynamical bicycle model with nonlinear tire forces as
described in [4].
To achieve high-performance driving we use a two-level
hierarchical controller following the structure of [27]. The
upper level of the controller generates a trajectory pair based
on one of the three racing games and the path planning model
studied in the experimental set-up of [27]. The path planning
model makes use of the so-called constant velocity segments
to generate a tree of alternative paths for each car. To provide a
longer prediction horizon at a manageable computation burden
longer sampling times and fewer prediction steps are used.
Following [27], for the path planning model we use number
prediction steps N = 3, discretization time Tpp = 0.16 s and
number of constant velocities Nm = 129. Fig. 4 shows an
example of trajectories resulting from the path planning model.
At the lower level, we employ an MPC controller to track the
trajectories corresponding to the optimal trajectory pair. The
lower level MPC uses the linearized bicycle model, and also
enforces track constraints; more details can be found in [27].
Note that the two levels are coupled since the lower level needs
a trajectory to track, which is computed by one of the racing
games, and the higher level racing game cannot generate inputs
to the car which allow driving at the limit.
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Fig. 4. Possilbe trajectories of the path planning model for two cars using
the viability-based pruning presented in [27]
Note that brute force implementation of the racing bimatrix
game would, in this case, require forming two 1293 × 1293
payoff matrices, clearly a formidable computational task. To
reduce the computation we rely on viability-based pruning
of the trajectories [27], which excludes trajectories that are
doomed to leave the track either immediately or at a later
stage. Thus, these pruning strategies are non-heuristic since
the trajectories would have a payoff of λ in the long run.
Following [27, Section 4] we use either the viability or the
discriminating kernel to prune the trajectories. The two kernels
lead to comparable lap times but differences in driving style
that, in the context of the present paper, result in interest-
ing racing behaviors. More precisely, pruning based on the
discriminating kernel results in a more conservative driving
style, breaking earlier into curves but achieving higher exit
velocities out of curves. Pruning based on the viability kernel,
on the other hand, results in a more aggressive driving style.
In the following, we will use PV to denote the player using
the viability kernel and PD the player using the discriminating
kernel to prune the trajectories.
To generate the bimatrix game, we assume that each car
shares their possible trajectories with the opponent. Alterna-
tively, it would also be possible to share the path planning
model and the pruning strategy at the beginning of the race,
and online only share the current state. For real racing, this
can be extended by estimating the opponents constant velocity
points as well as estimating the state based on sensors. The
estimation of the constant velocity points is simplified by the
fact that similar cars have similar constant velocities. Thus,
each car only needs to adapt its own model to get an estimate
of the opponent’s model. Alternatively, for the cooperative
game a modified best response method can be used which is
guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium [38], where only
a sequence of best response trajectories needs to be shared to
solve each game.
To further reduce the computation time, we compute col-
lisions using a two-step collision detection: first, the distance
between the center of the cars is checked, only if the distance
is small enough for a collision to be possible in a second step
a separating axis collision detection algorithm is used [39].
Finally, we compute progress of all remaining trajectories.
The projection (1) is computed by first generating offline a
piecewise affine approximation of the center line, comprising
488 pieces; online the projection can then be computed by
finding the closest affine piece and taking an inner product.
All the tasks except the path planning model run at a sampling
time of 20 ms allowing for accurate collision checks and fast
feedback. To be able to react fast to the changes of the
opponent player and to deal with model mismatch the game
is also repeated every 20 ms.
The last implementation detail is concerned with the soft
constraints, any constraint violation of more than 1 cm is
treated as a collision between the cars. Note that thereby
the problem is not always feasible and that in a case where
no feasible solution can be found the car behind initiates an
emergency braking maneuver, until the problem is feasible
again.
B. Results
The racing games were evaluated in a simulation study,
where the cars are initiated at 500 different random initial
positions along the center line of the track. To guarantee
feasible initial conditions the cars are initiated at a low
forward velocity of 0.5 m/s, tangentially to the center line.
To promote interesting racing situations we choose the initial
position of the two cars in close proximity (0-20 cm apart) and
the physical parameters of both cars are identical, including
engine power, braking power, and tire models. For each initial
position, the simulation is run for 40 s, which corresponds to
approximately four laps.
We compare three cases of the presented racing games.
In the first case the optimal strategy pair is computed using
the Sackelberg equilibrium of the sequential game (5), in the
second case that of the cooperative game and in the third
case that of the blocking game (9) with w = 100. Recall
that the solutions of the first two approaches are identical if
Assumption 2.b is fulfilled, but may differ otherwise. We also
assume that the players play truthfully. This is reasonable since
deviating from this trajectory leads to a lower payoff, either
due to a collision or to worse progress. We note, however,
that in the blocking game the leader could benefit from being
untruthful. Simulation studies also showed that other methods
such as random play do lead to a worse payoff, in some cases
even for both players.
TABLE I
SIMULATION STUDY OF THE RACING GAMES
seq. game coop. game blocking game
(PV/PD) (PV/PD) (PV/PD)
# of overtaking 113 857 414
maneuvers (4/109) (502/355) (231/183)
# of runs with over-
taking maneuvers 106 309 220
collision probability 5.42 · 10−3 4.59 · 10−3 5.28 · 10−3
Let us start by noting that in all cases we observe a
substantial number of overtaking maneuvers (see Table I),
even though both cars have the same power, and only differ
in the pruning strategies they employ. However, it is visible
that the sequential game has the fewest overtaking maneuvers.
The cooperative game has by far the most overtaking ma-
neuvers, whereas the blocking game has approximately half
as many overtaking maneuvers. It is also interesting to see
that the cooperative and blocking game lead to a more even
distribution of overtaking maneuvers between the different
pruning strategies. This stands in contrast to the sequential
game, where nearly all overtaking maneuvers are performed
by the player using the discriminating kernel as a their pruning
strategy (PD). When looking at the probability of a collision,
we can see that all three implementations have a low empirical
collision probability of around 5 · 10−3, especially given the
close initial proximity of the cars. The cooperative game has
the lowest collision probability and the sequential game the
highest. Note that some of the collisions can also be caused by
the fact that the low-level MPC does not consider the collision
constraints. Even though experimental and simulation results
suggest that the low-level MPC can follow the trajectory very
precisely, the games are sometimes so tight that even sub-
millimeter tracking errors can result in a collision.
The main reason for the observed trends is first and foremost
the fact that in the sequential game the leader does not consider
the follower. This explains the fewer overtaking maneuvers,
the higher collision probability, and the observation that PV
has nearly no overtaking maneuvers. Almost all overtaking
maneuver need a certain cooperation between the cars, and
this holds especially when PV overtakes PD. In the sequential
game the leader does not consider the follower and ignores
the risk of a collision. Due to the layout of the track,
this is an advantage for PD, which can prevent nearly all
overtaking maneuvers, whereas PV is not able to do so. In the
cooperative and blocking games the leader adapts his strategy
to accommodate the follower. This helps to prevent collisions,
but at the same time allows for overtakes by the opposing car.
In the blocking game the leader does consider the follower,
and helps to prevent a collision, but at the same time actively
tries to avoid overtaking maneuvers. This, in the end, results
in a middle ground both in terms of overtaking and collision
probability.
Similar trends can also be seen when analyzing the overall
payoff of the game. Table II, shows the mean progress of the
different games, in how many runs the car starting ahead was
TABLE II
PAYOFF OF THE RACING GAMES
seq. game coop. game blocking game
(PV/PD) (PV/PD) (PV/PD)
mean progress [m] 82.89 82.49 82.53
# of stay 384 292 329
ahead runs (148/236) (230/62) (196/133)
# of wins (156/344) (412/88) (307/193)
able to also be ahead at the end and how many times which
player won. The first two metrics are directly the ones we
try to maximize in our games, and the third is, in a sense,
the long term objective of the players. We can see that the
sequential game achieves the largest progress of the three
games, whereas the cooperative and the blocking game achieve
very similar values. The sequential game achieves the largest
progress because the leader does not adapt his strategy thus
only optimizing the progress. In the other games, there are
also more overtaking maneuvers which slow down the cars.
The number of stay ahead runs, and winning runs show a
similar trend to overtaking in Table I. The sequential game is
the best to stay ahead and win but does this by causing more
and also deeper collisions. From the stay ahead and winning
runs, it is even better to see how the additional term in the
blocking game helps to be more competitive compared to the
cooperative game.
To further highlight the difference between the three dif-
ferent game approaches, one of the 500 simulation runs
is shown in a video which can be found at: https://youtu.
be/3Skl5qeFum8 for the sequential game, https://youtu.be/
Cp9OchB2S M for the cooperative game, and https://youtu.
be/Xxa8W9D3Z A for the blocking game. The videos em-
phasize the points discussed above, where the sequential game
has zero overtaking maneuvers but there are collisions, in the
blocking game there is only one overtaking maneuver, but in
the cooperative game there are three overtaking maneuvers.
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Fig. 5. Time elapse of two overtaking maneuvers. Left side cooperative game,
right blocking game. The blue car is PV and the red car PD, the cars are shown
every 0.3 s and every second time the car is dashed to highlight which cars
are at the same time step. The driven trajectory also is also shown as a dotted
line, where each dot is 0.02 s apart. In both cases, the blue car can overtake
the red car, but in the blocking game, the red car drives a more aggressive
trajectory which tries to prevent the overtaking maneuver.
1) Remarks on difference in driving style and car dynamics:
The above simulation study investigated the case where one
player PV uses the viability and the other player PD the
discriminating kernel to prune their trajectories. Thus, the
driving style of the two players is quite different, with PV
being “aggressive” and PD “cautious.” However, both players
have the same model and identical cars. To further investigate
the influence of different driving styles and differences in
the cars, we also investigated the effect of a reduced motor
power of one of the car as well as using the same approach
to prune the trajectories for both players; the latter results
in a race between identical cars and drivers. The simulation
results show as expected that reducing the motor power of
one car leads to more overtaking maneuvers. However, the
influence is smaller than expected as the power constraint
mainly influenced the maximal velocity, which is not too
important in the used track layout. Using the same pruning
strategy for both players drastically reduced the amount of
overtaking maneuvers. However, even though the drivers and
the cars are identical overtaking maneuvers still occur. In
conclusion, we noticed that the change in the driving style
induced by different pruning strategies seems to be more
important than power differences between the cars.
C. Computation time
Simulations were carried out on a computer running Debian
equipped with 16 GB of RAM and a 3.6 GHz Intel Xeon quad-
core processor. When investigating the computation times
reported in Table III, one can see that the computation times
for the trajectory generation step is very similar for all three
games, which is expected as the different cases only have a
minor influence on the trajectory planning phase. However, the
collision check for the sequential game is significantly faster
than the collision checks for the other two games.
TABLE III
COMPUTATION TIME OF THE RACING GAMES
seq. game coop. game blocking game
mean traj. generation [s] 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027
max traj. generation [s] 0.0358 0.0314 0.0317
mean collision check [s] 0.0012 0.3365 0.2545
max collision check [s] 0.0738 109.81 112.31
The reason is that the cooperative and blocking game require
checking collisions of all trajectories of both players with each
other. Roughly speaking this computation grows quadratically
in the number of trajectories available to the players and can
result in up to 109 collision checks. In the sequential game,
when using the sequential maximization approach, collisions
are only checked between the best trajectory of the leader
and all trajectories of the follower. In this case, the number
of collision checks grows only linearly in the number of
trajectories available to the players. We can say that the
sequential game is close to real-time feasible, whereas the
cooperative and blocking game are significantly slower and
would need radical changes to implement in real-time.
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented a non-cooperative game approach for one-to-
one racing of two autonomous cars. Three approaches to model
the interaction between the two players were considered and
formulated as bimatrix games. In the first two approaches the
interaction is limited to collision constraints, and each player
optimizes his progress. The third approach augments the cost
function by rewarding staying ahead at the end of the horizon
to emphasize blocking behavior. For online implementation the
game is played in a moving horizon fashion and two methods
were proposed to deal with the loss of feasibility in closed-
loop. A simulation study shows that the proposed games can be
used for competitive autonomous racing of two cars. The main
observation is that the sequential game where the follower is
completely neglected seems to be the most efficient blocking
technique in closed-loop, but also comes with the highest risk
of a collision.
In future work, we plan to implement the games on our
experimental set-up. To make this possible the computation
time has to be substantially decreased. We envision accom-
plishing this by, among others, more efficient heuristic trajec-
tory pruning techniques and exploiting the parallelizability of
the method. Finally, we also plan to incorporate the collision
constraints in the low-level MPC problem using the method
proposed in [40].
APPENDIX A
PATH PLANNING MODEL
The path planning model is based on a dynamic bicycle
model with nonlinear tire forces. The states of the system are
the positions X and Y , the heading angle ϕ, the longitudinal
and lateral velocity vx and vy , as well as the yaw rate ω. The
control inputs are the steering angle δ and the pulse width
modulation duty cycle d of the drive train motor. The equations
of motion are
X˙ = vx cos(ϕ)− vy sin(ϕ) ,
Y˙ = vx sin(ϕ) + vy cos(ϕ) ,
ϕ˙ = ω , (14)
v˙x =
1
m
(
Fr,x(vx, d)− Ff,y(vx, vy, ω, δ) sin δ +mvyω
)
,
v˙y =
1
m
(
Fr,y(vx, vy, ω) + Ff,y(vx, vy, ω, δ) cos δ −mvxω
)
,
ω˙ =
1
Iz
(
Ff,y(vx, vy, ω, δ)lf cos δ − Fr,y(vx, vy, ω)lr
)
,
where m is the mass of the vehicle, Iz is the moment of
inertia, and lr and lf are the distances from the CoG to the
rear and the front wheel, respectively. The most important
part are the forces modeling the tires, where Fr,x(vx, d) is
the drivetrain force, Fr,y(vx, vy, ω) and Ff,y(vx, vy, ω, δ) are
the lateral forces at the rear and the front wheel, modeled
using the Pacejka tire model [41]. For more details and the
exact tire model formulation, we refer to [4].
Based on the bicycle model (14), the path planning model
can be derived by looking at constant velocity points. These
are points in the model where v˙x = v˙y = ω˙ = 0. By selecting
Nm such points, in our case Nm = 129 a library of motion
primitives can be formed. If the velocity is fixed to one of these
constant velocities the three velocity states can be neglected,
and the resulting trajectory is either a circle or a straight.
Based on these motion primitives one can build a new
vehicle model, where the car drives with one of these constant
velocities for a fixed time Tpp, after that time a new constant
velocity point can be selected from the library. This direct
concatenation of these constant velocity segments is motivated
by the time scale separation present in the system where the
velocities change fast enough, such that at a sampling time
of Tpp they can be regarded as constant. However, for this
assumption to hold we need to constrain the motion primitives
that can be concatenated. We do this by adding an automaton
to the dynamics which limits the concatenation of constant
velocity points. The automaton is generated such that there
exist inputs to the bicycle model (14) which achieve the
transition from one to another constant velocity point within
a time that is smaller than Tpp. For our model, we use a
sampling time of Tpp = 0.16 s, whereas the transition can
be achieved within 0.1 s. Note that the model is hybrid due to
the discrete mode, which corresponds to the constant velocity
point, and the continuous dynamics describing the position and
heading when the car drives with a specific constant velocity
mode. However, when the continuous trajectory between the
sampling points, where the constant velocity point can be
switched, is neglected. The system can be formulated as a
discrete-time system by embedding the discrete mode q in
the real line. The resulting discrete time system is given by
x¯k+1 = f¯(x¯, uk) with u ∈ U(q), as described in Section
II-A. Where f¯(x¯, uk) describes the kinematic part of the car
model when driving with a constant velocity (integration of the
position and heading dynamics in (14)) as well as the dynamics
on the discrete mode q, and u ∈ U(q) is the automaton
concatenation constraint.
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